Protecting the Appearance of Judicial Impartiality in the Face of Law Clerk Employment Negotiations by Swan, Kevin D.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 62 
Number 4 Dedicated to Robert S. Hunt 
10-1-1987 
Protecting the Appearance of Judicial Impartiality in the Face of 
Law Clerk Employment Negotiations 
Kevin D. Swan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Judges Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kevin D. Swan, Comment, Protecting the Appearance of Judicial Impartiality in the Face of Law Clerk 
Employment Negotiations, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 813 (1987). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol62/iss4/16 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
PROTECTING THE APPEARANCE OF JUDICIAL
IMPARTIALITY IN THE FACE OF LAW CLERK
EMPLOYMENT NEGOTIATIONS
Without armies to carry out their judgments, courts are dependent on the
consent of the governed. . . to make their pronouncements law. When the
image of the judiciary is tarnished, the moral authority of the courts is
critically undermined. The appearance of partiality. . . is the greatest threat
that confronts our judges.1
Judicial clerkships2 are considered plums to be picked by some of the
best graduates of the top law schools. 3 Thus, judicial law clerks are usually
bright and ambitious. 4 Many clerks view their employment with judges as a
chance for an excellent post-graduate education and an opportunity to work
with some of the best legal minds available. 5
Most clerks also look forward to using the experience gained in their
clerkships as a means to attaining prestigious legal positions. 6 Employers, 7
aware that judicial law clerks often represent the top graduates of the
country's law schools, eagerly seek to hire such clerks. 8 Recruiting sched-
ules dictate that clerks and employers negotiate for the clerks' employment
while the clerkships are still underway.9
This employment negotiation presents a problem, since the clerk's
potential employers often act as counsel before the judge for whom the
clerk works. Employment negotiations between the clerk and counsel for
one side can damage both the clerk's and the judge's appearance of
impartiality due to the clerk's apparent conflict of interest. This damage to
I. J. MACKENm, THE APPEARANCE OF JuSncE at x (1974).
2. Although this Comment refers specifically to law clerks in the federal courts, many of the state
courts face the same requirements as federal courts regarding the appearance of impartiality. See Levy,
Judicial Recusals, 2 PACE L. REv. 35, 36 (1982). Therefore, much of this Comment applies to state
courts as well. However, the nature of the law clerk position and its use by judges may vary significantly
as one proceeds from the United States Supreme Court down to the state courts. See Baler, The Law
Clerks: Profile of an Institution, 26 VAND. L. Rv. 1125, 1129 (1973) (invocation address at Law Clerk
Institute, Louisiana State University Law Center, Aug. 30, 1972).
3. Baier, supra note 2, at 1138; Lauter, Clerkships: Picking the Elite, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 9, 1987, at
28, col. 1.
4. Judges want to hire talented law graduates to ensure the best assistance available. Lauter, supra
note 3, at 28, col. 1.
5. See Baler, supra note 2, at 1161-62.
6. Lauter, supra note 3, at 1, col. 1.
7. As used in this Comment, "employers" will refer to entities such as law firms, government
agencies, and others which provide employment to law clerks after their tenure with judges. This
Comment will use the phrase "future employer" to refer to an employer from whom the clerk has
accepted an offer, and "proffering employer" as one from which the clerk has received an offer.
8. Lauter, supra note 3, at 1, col. 1.
9. Id.
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the appearance of impartiality could result in the judge's recusal or reversal
of the case if recusal is later deemed to have been called for. This Comment
examines the relationship among judges, law clerks, and the requirements
placed on both to maintain the appearance of impartiality. It also addresses
current standards applied to this problem and evaluates those standards
based on the policies behind the cases and rules governing conflicts of
interest. It analyzes what circumstances mandate removal of clerks from
cases, as well as what circumstances mandate the removal of the clerks'
respective judges. Finally, this Comment proposes a rule of professional
responsibility for judges and clerks to follow when the clerks are involved
in employment negotiations, and suggests the implementation of training
and communication practices to avoid altogether many of the problems
created when clerks negotiate for employment.
I. JUDGES, LAW CLERKS, AND THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPARTIALITY
To understand the connection between law clerks' employment negotia-
tions and the recusal of their respective judges, one must examine the
requirements placed upon judges and law clerks to maintain the appearance
of impartiality. Additionally, the relationship between judges and their
clerks as well as the connections between the clerks' behavior and the
judges' appearance must be examined.
A. Recusal: Judges and the Appearance of Impartiality
The courts rely upon the faith of the public for the enforceability of their
decisions. ' 0 The public's willingness to accede to the courts' decisions is a
fundamental assumption of the American system of government. " A lack
of acceptance of judicial authority leaves the judiciary little power to
implement its decisions. ' 2
The public will not support judicial decisions unless the public believes
the judiciary is impartial.' 3 When a few judges are not impartial in the
conduct of their duties, they can damage the public's belief in the impar-
10. See Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
820 (1980); Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L. REV. 736,
746-47 (1973); J. MACKENZIE, supra note 1, at x.
11. Potashnick, 609 F.2dat 1111; Note, supra note 10, at746-47;J. MACKENZIE, supra note 1, atx.
12. President Jackson is supposed to have said, after hearing of an unpopular decision by Chief
Justice John Marshall, "Well, John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it." Clark,
Internal Operation of the United States Supreme Court, 43 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 45, 47 (1959).
13. Note, supra note 10, at 746-47.
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tiality of the entire judicial system. 14 To many ordinary litigants, justice
is synonymous with winning.15 A loss is tolerable, however, if the losing
party feels that the process, at least, is fair. 16 Thus, one of the principal
objectives of those seeking to minimize judicial misconduct is to bolster
public confidence in the neutrality of the courts. 17
Actual lack of impartiality or actual impropriety is rarely a problem in
the American court system. 18 The vast majority of judges behave in
accordance with high ethical standards. 19 Sometimes, however, conduct
which in fact is quite innocent can appear otherwise.20 Most often only the
judge knows what took place and whether any misconduct actually oc-
curred. Onlookers, the general public and attorneys, must rely upon their
perception of events. If the public believes that a judge has acted un-
ethically, it is of little avail that there is no truth in the perception.21 An
appearance of a lack of impartiality will do as much or more damage to the
public's confidence in the judicial system as any actual lack of impar-
tiality. 22 Therefore, judges are called upon to avoid not only actual im-
propriety but the appearance of impropriety as well. 23
In 1948 Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 455 ("Section 455")24 to govern
judicial recusal. In this section, Congress utilized a standard of actual
14. D. FRErz, ETICS FOR JUDGES I (2d ed. 1975); see also Potashnick, 609 F.2d at 1111.
15. Comment, Meeting the Challenge: Rethinking Judicial Disqualification, 69 CALIF. L. REv.
1445, 1480 (1981).
16. J. MACKENziE, supra note 1, at 239-40.
17. Potashnick, 609 F.2d at 1111; see also Comment, Disqualification of Judges for Prejudice or
Bias-Common Law Evolution, Current Status, and The Oregon Experience, 48 OR. L. REv. 311, 313
(1969). Of course, such rules also seek to remove actual impartiality in the courts.
18. J. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS 292 (1974).
19. Goulden noted that, as of 1974, "[more than 2,000 persons ha[d] served as federal judges;
only eight ha[d] been impeached by the House of Representatives, and of those, only four were
convicted by the Senate and thrown from office. By contrast, that many members of Congress have been
convicted as felons in a single session." Id. at 292.
20. See, e.g., Hall v. Small Business Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1983). The magistrate
whose recusal was sought in this case gave extensive reasons why his clerk had had no actual effect on
his decision. Yet the court reviewing his failure to recuse himself found actual effects irrelevant. Id. at
179.
21. Ofcourse, the appearance must have some reasonable basis to be credible, and not merely be an
attack on ajudge to avoid an unfavorable result. H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6351, 6355 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
22. Actual partiality may never be disclosed, and the public's confidence would not be damaged by
something it never found out. The appearance of partiality, however, is known, since the behavior must
appear partial to someone. See J. MACKENziE, supra note 1, at ix.
23. American Bar Association (A.B.A.) CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUcr Canon 2 (1972). "Judicial
ethics. . . exact more than virtuous behavior; they command impeccable appearance." Hall v. Small
Business Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 176 (5th Cir. 1983).
24. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 21, 62 Stat. 908 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982))
[hereinafter Act of June 25, 1948]. For a history of recusal see Slovenko, "Je Rdcuse!": The
Disqualification of a Judge, 19 LA. L. REv. 644 (1959).
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impartiality, based on the judge's perception. Section 455 relied upon
judges to recuse themselves when certain circumstances rendered it im-
proper, "in the [their] opinion," for them to hear the case. 25 Cases inter-
preting Section 455 inferred a "duty to sit. "26 Judges presumed that they
should normally hear cases unless it would be improper in fact for them to
do so. In a situation where there were only doubts about their impartiality,
judges would err on the side of hearing the case. 27 The actual partiality
standard has been criticized as doing little to bolster public confidence
since it is the public's perception of neutrality, not that of the judiciary,
which governs the public's faith in the judicial system. 28
In response to criticisms of the actual impartiality standard, the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct (C.J.C.) 2 9 introduced the
appearance of impartiality standard in 1972. The C.J.C. provides that "[a]
judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned .... "30 The test requires an objective
determination of only the appearance of impartiality, not actual impar-
tiality. If a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would be led
to question the judge's impartiality, the judge should recuse him or her-
self.3 1
Finally, in 1974 the appearance of impartiality standard was codified in
an amendment of Section 455.32 Once a judge's impartiality is questioned,
25. Act of June 25, 1948, supra note 24. Section 455 read: "Any justice or judge of the United
States shall disqualify himself in any case in which he. . .is so related to or connected with any party
or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial .
26. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 6355.
27. See Levy, supra note 2, at 46.
28. Comment, supra note 15, at 1481-82; Note, supra note 10, at 764; see also supra notes 18-22
and accompanying text.
29. A.B.A. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972); see also E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT 49 (1973); Note, supra note 10, at 745. The A.B.A. Code of Judicial Conduct was
approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in 1973, and was adopted by that body as the
Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges. 69 F.R.D. 273 (1976) [hereinafter C.J.C.]. The
language of the A.B.A. Code of Judicial Conduct was "largely retained." Id. The A.B.A. Code of
Judicial Conduct was, as are all A.B.A. codes, non-binding, but the C.J.C. was made binding on all
federal judges. Id.
30. C.J.C., supra note 29, Canon 3(C)(l).
3 1. Recusal is a means whereby judges remove themselves from a case upon their own or the
parties' motion. See Kilgarlin & Bruch, Disqualification and Recusal of Judges, 17 ST. MARY'S L. J.
599 (1986) (discussion of differences in the terms "disqualification" and "recusal").
32. The amendment incorporated much of Canon 3 of the C.J.C. (with a few changes). Compare 28
U.S.C. § 455 (1982) with C.J.C., supra note 29, Canon 3(C). Sub-section (a) of the amended Section
455 reads: "(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
The adoption of the C.J.C.'s language shifted the basis for recusal from an actual partiality standard
to an appearance of partiality standard. Smith v. Pepsico, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 524, 525 (S.D. Fla. 1977);
see also E. THODE, supra note 29, at 60-61.
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the judge decides only whether there is a reasonable basis for the question.
The new, objective standard focuses on the point of view of the reasonable
person. 33 The new Section 455 also repudiates the duty to sit, and requires
that judges decide doubtful cases on the side of caution and recusal.34
B. Law Clerks and the Appearance of Impartiality
The introduction of the position of law clerk35 in 1882 by Justice Gray36
was not an historical accident, but a direct result of the burgeoning docket
which was then beginning to build at the Supreme Court.37 By assigning
some of the research and other work to law clerks, the Justices were better
able to handle the administrative and judicial load presented by the increas-
ing number of cases in the late nineteenth century.38 The practice of hiring
law clerks grew in the twentieth century, 39 and eventually spread to the
federal circuit and district courts. 40 The use of law clerks has become so
33. See Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 820. In a change from the language used in the C.JC., and in the older version of the statute,
recusal was made mandatory whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The
word "should" in the older version of Section 455 was changed to "shall" in the amended version.
Compare C.J.C., supra note 29, Canon 3(C) and Act of June 25, 1948, supra note 24, with 28 U.S.C.
§ 455 (1982). This change was intended to support further the public's confidence in the impartiality of
the judiciary. HousE REPORT, supra note 21, at 6354-55. See generally Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v.
RCA Corp., 569 F.2d 251,256-57 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978); 8 FED. PRoc., L. ED.
§ 20:39 (1982). Now if there is a question about judges' impartiality, and they find that the basis for the
doubt is reasonable, they must recuse themselves. Fredonia, 569 F.2d at 256-57.
34. Congress explicitly removed the duty to sit with the adoption of the new version of Section 455.
HousE REPORT, supra note 21, at 6355; see also 8 FED. PRoc., L. ED. § 20:39 (1982). Now, a judge
should seek to "err on the side of caution and [recuse] himself in a questionable case." Potashnick, 609
F.2d at 1112. Some cases still seem to rely upon the duty to sit doctrine. See Annotation, Recusal-Law
Clerk's Conduct, 65 A.L.R. FED. 775, 782 n.16 (1983).
Although it is important that judges be sensitive to the appearance of partiality, Congress did not
intend for parties to use Section 455 as a means for picking their own judges. HOUSE REPORT, supra note
21, at 6355. While there is no duty to sit on cases in which there is a reasonable basis for questioning a
judge's impartiality, judges need not and should not recuse themselves when the moving party merely
fears an unfavorable result. "Litigants ought not have to face a judge where there is a reasonable
question of impartiality, but they are not entitled to judges of their own choice." Id.
35. The term "law clerk" was first used in a statute in 1919. Act of July 19, 1919, ch. 24, 41 Stat.
209. This Comment uses the term to mean ajudicial law clerk, not the clerk of the court, docket clerk, or
deputy clerk. For a discussion of the origin and development of the term "law clerk," see Baler, supra
note 2, at 1130-31 & 1130 n.22.
36. Newland, PersonalAssistants to Supreme Court Justices: TheLaw Clerks, 40 OR. L. REv. 299,
301 (1961).
37. Baler, supra note 2, at 1133; see also Newland, supra note 36, at 301.
38. Baler, supra note 2, at 1132.
39. Id. at 1132-33; Newland, supra note 36, at 301-305.
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 712 (1982) (providing clerks for circuit courtjudges); 28 U.S.C. § 752 (1982)
(providing clerks for district court judges). Use of law clerks is also widespread among state courts,
817
Washington Law Review Vol 62:813, 1987
commonplace that the position of law clerk has been referred to as "an
institution. ,41
Law clerks play a visible and important role in the judicial system.
Judges depend upon clerks to perform many routine tasks.42 Law clerks
have no statutorily defined duties; tasks are generally assigned at an
individual judge's discretion.43 Some duties, however, are common. A
clerk generally does intensive research, often providing the precedent upon
which the judge's opinion will rest.44 The clerk may write memoranda
setting out the issues and applicable law in cases before the court, 45 or the
clerk may summarize the arguments of the parties.46 Many judges use their
clerks as sounding boards for ideas and theories about the cases before the
court.47 Some judges even direct their law clerks to write drafts of opin-
ions. 48 At the appellate level, a number of courts permit law clerks to select
cases for disposition without oral argument. 49 The clerks write memoranda
and propose specific dispositions of those cases. Often the judges adopt
such recommendations. Many of the federal circuits have permitted hun-
dreds of such abbreviated dispositions. 50 In addition to serving as profes-
sional aides, clerks, because of the close working relationship, may be-
come confidants of their respective judges. 51
especially the state appellate and supreme courts. P. BARNETT, LAW CLERKS IN THE UNITED STATES
COURTS AND STATE APPELLATE COURTS 1 (1973) (an American Judicature Society research study).
41. Baier, supra note 2, at 1125. See generally Judicial Clerkships: A Symposium on the Institution,
26 VAND. L. REv. 1123 (1973). There are an estimated 1100 law clerks working in federal courts today.
Lauter, supra note 3, at I col. 1.
42. Some typical law clerk duties include performing legal research, drafting, editing, cite
checking, serving as courtroom crier, and running errands. See A. DILEo & A. RUBIN, LAW CLERK
HANDBOOK § 1.1 (1977) [hereinafter LAW CLERK HANDBOOK].
43. "The tasks of... clerks are . . . very much the product of the whims of their Justices." J.
FRANK, MARBLE PALACE 116 (1958) (referring to United States Supreme Court law clerks); see also P.
BARNETT, supra note 40, at 3; Comment, The Law Clerk's Duty of Confidentiality, 129 U. PA. L. REv.
1230, 1234 (1981).
44. Hall v. Small Business Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Fredonia
Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 569 F.2d 251, 255-56 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859;
Edwards, The Avoidance of Appellate Delay, Panel Discussion before the Section on Judicial Admin-
istration, Appellate Judges Conference, Proceedings of the A.B.A. 93rd Annual Meeting, Aug. 8,
1970, 52 F.R.D. 61, 68 (1971) [hereinafter Panel Discussion].
45. Dorsen, Law Clerks in Appellate Courts in the United States, 26 MOD. L. REv. 265, 268
(1963); Baier, supra note 2, at 1149.
46. Dorsen, supra note 45, at 268; J. FRANK, supra note 43, at 116.
47. Hall, 695 F.2d at 179; see also Fredonia, 569 F.2d at 255-56; Baier, supra note 2, at 1145.
48. Smith, A Primer of Opinion Writing for Law Clerks, 26 VAND. L. REv. 1203 (1973). Not all
judges have clerks draft opinions, but mounting case loads may prompt an increase in the practice. Id.;
see also Wright, Observations of an Appellate Judge: The Use of Law Clerks, 26 VAND. L. REv. 1179,
1191(1973).
49. Baier, supra note 2, at 1160.
50. Wright, supra note 48, at 1185-86 n.31.
51. Comment, supra note 43, at 1232. When the position of law clerk was established, and for
many years thereafter, judges and their clerks were often quite close personally. Some clerks paid their
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Due to the close professional and personal relationship between law
clerks and judges, afew observers fear that clerks are able to exert too much
influence on decisions. 52 Some have alleged that clerks have sought to
further their own political agenda, for example, by influencing the trend of
decisions. 53 Even if clerks do nothing but conduct research and prepare
memoranda, they might influence judges by a subtle manipulation of the
facts. 54 The most common charge, though, is that law clerks who draft
opinions exert too much influence on the course of those decisions.55
judges' bills, or lived in their judges' homes. Newland, supra note 36, at 311; see also McCormack, A
Law Clerk's Recollections, 46 CoLUM. L. Rav. 710, 717-18 (1946).
Some judges have not been on close terms-or necessarily even cordial terms-with their law clerks.
Justice McReynolds, it is said, had difficulty locating and retaining clerks, perhaps because "in his
earlier years he insisted that his clerks remain single and refrain from the use of tobacco." Newland,
supra note 36, at 306; see also B. WOODWARD & S. ARmSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 240-43 (1979)
(discussing Justice Douglas' sometimes stormy relationships with his clerks).
52. "Th[e] idea of the law clerk's [inordinate] influence gave rise to a lawyer's waggish statement
that the Senate no longer need bother about cotifirmation of [Supreme Court] justices but ought to
confirm the appointment of law clerks." Clark, supra note 12, at 48.
53. Allegations were raised in the late 1950's and early 1960's that "liberal" law graduates from the
Ivy League law schools were "quietly and insidiously responsible for the [Supreme Court's] 'leftward'
trend." J. WHYuJNSON, SERviNG JusTicE 56 (1974). Several articles appeared in news magazines
debating the extent of law clerk influence in the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Rehnquist,
Who WritesDecisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 13,1957, at 74; Rogers,
Do Law Clerks Wield Power in Supreme Court Cases?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 21, 1958, at
114; Rehnquist, Another View: Clerks Might "Influence" Some Actions, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Feb. 21, 1958, at 116; Bickel, The Court: An Indictment Analyzed, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1958, § 6
(Magazine), at 16; N.Y. Times, May 18, 1958, § 6 (Magazine), at 4 (letter to the editor from Judge
Samuel H. Hofstadter).
54. The judge's selection, stress and arrangement of "the facts" can make the most peculiar
case look like routine. . . . Manipulation--nay, perception-of "the facts" is all-important;
judges, like witnesses observe differently according to temperament and circumstances..
"Imhe facts" take shape in court in the light of the result to be achieved.
Llewellyn, Legal Illusion, Law and the Modern Mind: A Symposium, 31 CoLuM. L. REV. 82, 83 (1931)
(Symposium on J. FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MmiD (1930)) (emphasis in original). In this
manipulation of facts, law clerks could also exert some change in the perceptions of those who read their
memoranda.
55. There are judges who do not permit any of their clerk's writing to appear in an opinion. See,
e.g., P. BARNEr, supra note 40, at 3; Medina, Some Reflections on the Judicial Function at the
Appellate Level, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 148, 153; Edwards, supra note 44, at 69; Baer, supra note 2, at
1153. Some judges incorporate some of their clerk's words and phrases when writing opinions. Id. at
1146. Some allow their clerks only to write the first draft of an opinion. Id. at 1146-47; Newland, supra
note 36, at 312. Others seem to allow more substantial contributions by their law clerks. "The most
notorious rumors concern Chief Justice Vinson, who is said to have done all his 'writing' with his hands
in his pockets, outlining to his clerks generally what he wanted, and then criticizing this bit or that in a
clerk's draft and making suggestions for revision." J FRANK, supra note 43, at 117-18.
Regardless of whether clerks draft opinions for judges or not, some say that clerks simply could not
influence the decisions. No matter how much influence a clerk might have, they say, not even a judge
may disregard precedent: Newland, supra note 36, at 314. Also, the process itself, especially at the
appellate level, guarantees that other judges will look over the opinion before it is handed down. Wright,
supra note 48, at 1189. Any attempt by clerks improperly to influence their judge would most likely be
caught by that judge and dismissed. Cf J. 'WnauNSON, supra note 53, at 58-59. If it is not, the judge's
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Even if clerks do not actually affect the ultimate resolutions of cases,
commentators note that clerks' opinions may have an effect in the margins
of a decision. 56 In areas of the law with which judges are unfamiliar, the
way their clerks state the facts or present the issues may lead the judges to a
conclusion on those particular issues.57 Some judges have admitted that
their clerks affect their decisions, if only in the way that the decisions are
reached.58
Regardless of actual influence, the perception of law clerks' influence on
judges is present, even among lawyers. 59 Perhaps because law clerks are
perceived as influencing decisions, cases and commentators suggest that
they should adhere to the same appearance of impartiality standard as their
judges. 6° The C.J.C. requires that judges hold their staff to the same
standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judges themselves. 61
Decisions in three federal circuits endorse this position. 62
fellow panelists would notice any aberrations. Id. Some critics have characterized reports of law clerk
influence to the clerks' own exaggeration of their importance. Judge Medina was quoted as saying that
law clerks "say, 'See that opinion of mine that came down yesterday.' Why, to listen to that going
around the courts you wouldn't think the judges had anything to do with an opinion except maybe to take
a quick glance and say, 'Okay, boy. Good work. Good work.'" M. SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT
107 (1970). Judge Medina had stated nine years earlier, however, that clerks are hired to help influence
the process. For this reason, he urged that, "[a]t all events, let us rule out the humbug and the honey and
look the facts full in the face." Medina, supra, at 155-56.
56. Medina, supra note 55, at 154-55; Newland, supra note 36, at 314-15; see also supra note 53.
Dean Acheson noted that "his" justice "wrote the opinion; I wrote the [Everest of] footnotes."
Acheson, Recollections of Service, 18 ALA. LAW. 355, 364 (1957). But one could recall the persistent
influence of some footnotes, for example, the well-known "Footnote 4" from the Carolene Products
case. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For reference to the
influence of "Footnote 4," see G. GUNTHER, CONSTUTIONAL LAW 473-74 (11th ed. 1985).
57. Dobson v. Camden, 502 F. Supp. 679, 680 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
58. Medina, supra note 55, at 155-56. This is understandable, since judges hire clerks to affect the
process, if no more than by reducing the burden of the docket. Id; see supra notes 37-41 and
accompanying text.
59. Justice Tom C. Clark wrote that "during my 10 years on the [United States Supreme] Court I
have been asked by prominent lawyers, who should know better, to please speak to my law clerks about
their petitions." Clark, supra note 12, at 48.
60. See, e.g., Miller Indus., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 516 F. Supp. 84, 88--89 (S.D. Ala.
1980); LAw CLERK HANDBOOK, supra note 42, § 2.110; Aronson & Martin, The Trial Court Clerk and
Professional Responsibility: A Suggestion for Training 1, 2 (1985) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with Washington Law Review) [hereinafter Aronson & Martin].
61. C.J.C., supra note 29, Canon 3(B)(2).
62. The Fifth Circuit held a law clerk to the same standards as his judge in determining whether the
law clerk's action was improper. Kennedy v. Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co., 551 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir.
1977) (judge should have recused himself where his clerk visited scene of the incident at issue and
reported back to judge); see also Price Bros. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444, 447 (6th
Cir. 1980) ("a judge may not direct his law clerk to do that which is prohibited to the judge."); Miller
Indus., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 516 F. Supp. 84 (S.D. Ala. 1980) (concurring decision in federal
district court now in Eleventh Ciruit). No circuits seem to contradict this idea.
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Much of the language of the Code of Judicial Conduct was incorporated
in the Judicial Conference of the United States' Code of Conduct for Law
Clerks. 63 Canon 2 of the Code of Conduct for Law Clerks remonstrates with
clerks to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety; 64 Canon 2
of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires the same of judges. 65
C. The Relationship Between the Law Clerk's Employment
Negotiations and the Judge's Appearance of Impartiality
Law clerks often begin interviewing for new positions during their
clerkships.66 Some employers considering clerks for employment may have
cases pending before the judges of the respective clerks. If the clerks are
negotiating for employment with these employers, the impartiality of the
clerks may be doubted. Observers, especially the opposing parties, may
suspect that the clerks are biased towards their proffering employers. 67
Further, these suspicions may attach to their judges.68
Three recent cases focus on the imputation of doubts about impartiality
from law clerks to judges. Miller Industries, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 6 9 presented a typical fact pattern. After an adverse judgment in the
bench trial, the defendant moved on several grounds, including the employ-
ment negotiations of the judge's law clerk, that the judge reverse his
decision and recuse himself. The clerk had accepted a position with
plaintiff's firm during the course of trial yet continued to work on that case
until he left the judge's employ.70 The district court judge assigned to
decide the recusal issue found the law clerk's employment negotiations to
63. Compare, CODE OF CoNDucr FOR LAw CLERKS Canons 2 & 3 (1981), reprinted in Guide to
Judiciary Policies and Procedures (Vol. 1-C), Chapter X, Personnel Policies and Procedures, Sub-
chapter 1735.7, Code of Conduct for Law Clerks, Section A, Canons, excerpted in Law Clerks
Orientation Program, Sept. 10-11, 1984 (9th Cir.) (unpublished) (on file with Washington LawReview)
[hereinafter CODE OF CoNDuCr FOR LAW CLERKs] with C.J.C., supra note 29, Canons 2 & 3.
64. CODE OF CoNDucr FOR LAw CLERKs, supra note 63, Canon 2 ("A Law Clerk Should Avoid
Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities").
65. C.J.C., supra note 29, Canon 2. Unfortunately, these codes serve only as general guidelines
with limited practical application.
66. Waiting to interview until their clerkships are over may mean at best a three-to six-month period
of unemployment, at worst a paucity of jobs at the larger firms (which may have chosen all their
associates by that time).
67. See, e.g., Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co., 783 F.2d 1011, 1015 (lth Cir. 1986); Hall v.
Small Business Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1983).
68. Hall, 695 F.2d at 179.
69. 516 F. Supp. 84 (S.D. Ala. 1980).
70. Id. at 88. The court reviewing this problem relied heavily on Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v.
RCA Corp., 569 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859. Even though Fredonia was
factually different the Miller Industries court found the principles established in Fredonia applicable.
Miller Indus., 516 F. Supp. at 88.
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be "the most troublesome aspect of the situation. " 7 1 The court concluded
that one party might have improper advantage due to the connection of the
judge's law clerk with a firm involved in the case. 72 The Miller Industries
court concluded that such a connection presented an appearance of im-
proper advantage, 73 and held that the judge should have recused himself.74
In Hall v. Small Business Administration75 the Small Business Admin-
istration (SBA) had lost a class action sex discrimination suit filed against
it. Later, the SBA discovered that the magistrate's law clerk had accepted a
job with the plaintiff's firm during the case's pendancy before the magis-
trate. 76 The clerk had been actively involved in the case, taking notes in
court and preparing bench memoranda. 77 In fact, the last thing that the
clerk had worked on before she left for private practice was that case. 78 The
SBA moved for reversal of the decision and recusal of the magistrate.
Despite the SBA's allegation that the law clerk's conduct damaged the
magistrate's appearance of impartiality, the magistrate declined to recuse
himself or to vacate the judgment. 79 According to the magistrate, the clerk
had performed little more than secretarial duties on the case.80 He implied
that, since the law clerk had had no actual effect on his decision, he was not
required to recuse himself.8 1
On appeal in 1983 the Fifth Circuit disagreed. Regardless of the clerk's
actual effect upon the magistrate's decision, the court concluded, the
clerk's continued participation in a case in which her future employers were
counsel gave rise to an impermissible appearance of partiality on the part of
the magistrate.82 The court declined to look into the actual work the clerk
71. Miller Indus., 516 F. Supp. at 88.
72. Id.
73. "When the law clerk has accepted employment with a law firm, there is the possibility that
continuing to work on a case before the trial judge in which the law firm is counsel might present an
unfair advantage to the party represented by that law firm." Id. at 88.
74. Id. at 90.
75. 695 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1983).
76. Id. at 178.
77. Id.
78. Id. The clerk was also a former employee of the SBA and a one-time member of the class of
plaintiffs involved in the suit; she had removed herself from the class at the magistrate's request. Id. at
177.
79. Id. at 178.
80. The magistrate stated that the clerk was "'little more than an amanuensis in th[e] case.' He
stated, 'I don't think that any female law clerk is going to give me a lot of input on how to decide a
case.'" Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 179. The court ordered the magistrate to recuse himself, remanded the case and vacated
the judgment, holding that the clerk's continued participation after she had accepted an offer from
plaintiff's firm gave rise to an impermissible appearance of partiality on the part of the magistrate, and
that he should therefore have recused himself. Id. at 179-80.
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performed after she had accepted the law firm's employment offer.83 The
court interpreted the amended Section 455 to require a judge to recuse
himself "if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would
harbor doubts about his impartiality." 84 The court concluded that "know-
ing" included only objectively ascertainable facts. To look beyond, into the
judge's chambers, would incorrectly interpret Section 455 as a test of
actual lack of bias, not a test of an appearance of impartiality.85 Thus,
actual bias or lack thereof was irrelevant. 86 In this case, the objectively
ascertainable facts, including the close relationship between clerks and
judges, 87 created an impermissible appearance of partiality. According to
the court, judges should seek to err on the side of recusal if they have any
questions about the propriety of sitting on a case.88
Three years after Hall the Eleventh Circuit, in Hunt v. American Bank &
Trust Co.,89 looked for actual bias on the part of the judge. 90 In the original
suit in district court, the receiver of a bankrupt life insurance company had
brought various charges against the defendant. 91 One of the parties brought
a recusal motion questioning the judge's appearance of impartiality.92 Two
of the district court judge's law clerks had accepted jobs with counsel for
the defendants while the case was pending before the court. 93 One of the
clerks worked on the case before accepting the job offer, but the judge
depicted the clerk's work on the case as "'ministerial only,' 94 and removed
the clerk from the case once the clerk had accepted defendants' job offer.
The other clerk apparently had no contact with the case in question. 95 The
district court judge dismissed the motion to recuse. 96
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit did not link questions about the law
clerk's appearance of impartiality to the judge. The court stated, "If a clerk
has a possible conflict of interest, it is the clerk, not the judge, who must be
83. Id. at 179.
84. Id. at 179 (citing Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 569 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859); see supra note 32.
85. Hall, 695 F.2d at 179.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 178-79 (citing Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1112 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980)).
89. 783 F2d 1011 (llth Cir. 1986).
90. "Absent actual bias, disqualification is necessary only if a reasonable person, knowing all the
circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality." Id. at 1015 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 1012.
92. Id. at 1015-16
93. Id. at 1015.
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disqualified. ", 97 The court averred that it agreed with the holdings in Miller
Industries and Hall: if clerks are removed from cases as soon as they accept
employment offers, no recusal of judges is necessary. 98 Despite this pur-
ported agreement, the court focused on the judge's characterization of the
actual events, not on the appearances.99 Regardless of a possible attach-
ment of doubts about the clerk's appearance of impartiality to his judge, the
court would apply disqualification as the exception, not the rule, if no
actual bias existed. 100
Both the Miller Industries and Hall courts imply that screening of the
law clerks in those cases could have prevented the judge's recusal. 01
Screening means the isolation of the law clerk from all contact with the
particular case. The clerk does not read or prepare any of the memoranda or
other documents associated with the case, nor is the clerk allowed to
participate in any discussions regarding the case.
Screening has been used in different conflict of interest situations to
prevent the imputation of conflicts of interest. For instance, government
lawyers often leave their agencies to join private employers. Their new
private employers may seek to represent a client against the former govern-
ment lawyer's previous agency. Rationally the same disqualification and
imputed disqualification rules which apply to other former client conflicts
should apply to such situations involving former government lawyers. ' 02
97. Id.
98. The court found that a reasonable person could wonder about a law clerk's impartiality in cases
in which his future employer is serving as counsel. Nevertheless the court did not impute these doubts to
the judge. "Clerks should not work on such cases, just as a judge should not hear cases in which his
business associates are involved." Id. at 1015.
99. The court's focus on actual partiality-rather than on the appearance of partiality to the
"person in the street"-can be seen in its reliance on thejudge's characterization of the nature of the law
clerk's involvement in the case. Id. at 1016.
100. Id. at 1016. The facts in Dobson v. Camden, 502 F. Supp. 679 (S.D. Tex. 1980), did not
involve law clerks' employment negotiations, but the court's decision is illustrative of extreme
sensitivity to appearances of judicial partiality created by law clerks' conflicts of interest. The court
stressed that it wished to avoid "even the suggestion of an appearance of partiality," even if it meant
"'bend[ing] over backwards .... '" Id. at 681.
101. Miller Indus., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 516 F. Supp. 84, 88 (S.D. Ala. 1980)
("continuing to work on a case before the trial judge in which the law firm is counsel might present an
unfair advantage to the party represented by that firm") (emphasis added); Hall v. Small Business
Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983) (the law clerk's "continuing participation with the
magistrate in a case in which her future employers were counsel gave rise to an appearance of partiality"
on the part of the magistrate) (emphasis added).
Hunt does not seem to draw such a bright line of requiring that the clerk be removed from all work.
The Hunt court did not find the clerk's "ministerial" work on the case after receiving his offer
important. 783 F.2d at 1016.
For a broader discussion of screening (of attorneys), see Comment, Federal Courts and Attorney
Disqualification: A Realistic Approach to Conflicts of Interest, 62 WASH. L. REv. 863 (1987).
102. In such cases, the same issues arise if the government lawyer is now in private practice and
seeks to represent a client against her previous employer (for example, an agency) as would arise for
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The government lawyers and their firms would be prohibited from repre-
senting new clients against the previous agency employer. The American
Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (M.R.P.C.), how-
ever, provide an entirely separate rule for government lawyers, and do not
call for an entire firm to be disqualified as long as the former government
lawyers are screened. 103
The M.R.P.C. seek to avoid deterring good lawyers from working in
government service by foregoing imputation of disqualification. Policy
reasons dictate that society needs good lawyers in government. 10 4 If the
imputed disqualification rule were applied to government lawyers, no firm
in their field would want to hire them after they left the government. 105
Facing such a bleak professional future after government service, many
good lawyers who might otherwise choose differently, would choose not to
work for the government. Therefore, even though former government
lawyers do have a conflict of interest which could be imputed to their entire
firm, for policy reasons the rules accommodate the appearance by provid-
ing screening. 10 6
II. PROTECTING JUDGES AND LAW CLERKS FROM THE
APPEARANCE OF PARTIALITY
Professional rules of conduct, both for judges and for their clerks, could
be established to provide that clerks must be screened whenever they have
received offers from employers with cases before the clerks' respective
judges. Policy bases for allowing judges to continue to sit even when their
clerks have received offers could be clearly set forth.
Training and better communication between clerks and judges could
obviate the need for further court decisions on imputing doubts about
appearances of impartiality from law clerks to judges. This Comment
suggests that all judges should provide as much training as possible
regarding potential ethical problems of their clerk's employment negotia-
tions. Such training could include written procedures, as well as directives
to clerks to keep their judges informed of all employment negotiations
contemplated or underway.
private attorneys and their firms in representing clients with conflicting interests. See infra notes 152-56
and accompanying text.
103. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 1.11 (1983) [hereinafter M.R.P.C.].
104. Id., Rule 1.11 comment.
105. Government lawyers will have the most expertise and the best employment opportunities in
cases involving their former agencies. If strict conflict of interest principles regarding imputed
disqualification were applied, the former government lawyer would be a sort of "Typhoid Mary,"




A. The Lack of Clarity and Policy Bases in Current Standards
The principal cases and rules dealing with law clerks' employment
negotiations and judges' appearance of impartiality do not indicate with
sufficient specificity when clerks should be screened, nor do they provide
adequate rules for or policies supporting screening. The cases do not agree
whether it is possible for doubts about a clerk's impartiality to attach to the
clerk's judge. Miller Industries and Hall both linked doubts about the
clerks' appearance of impartiality to their respective judges; Hunt found
that no doubts about the judge's impartiality had been created by the clerk's
apparent conflict of interest.
The cases' contradictory reasoning makes determination of appropriate
behavior based on their holdings difficult to define. All three cases purpor-
tedly evaluated their facts on the appearance of impartiality standard.
Miller Industries and Hall agree that screening is necessary when law
clerks have accepted employment offers giving rise to reasonable doubts
about the clerks' appearance of impartiality. 107 Hunt, however, seems to
approach from the other side, looking first to whether there is a problem
with actual impartiality on the judge's part, 10 8 and leaning away from
requiring recusal in the presence of actual impartiality regardless of ap-
pearances. 109 The Hunt court's focus on actual impartiality ignores the
importance of the appearance of impartiality, which is vital to the effec-
tiveness of the judiciary. "10
Not only do the cases focus on different standards, but the reasoning in
Miller Industries, Hall, and Hunt is simplistic and conclusory, weakening
the legitimacy of using screening to prevent doubts about the clerks'
impartiality from attaching to their respective judges. 11 The cases indicate
that doubts about clerks' impartiality are only reasonable when clerks have
accepted offers, not when they have received offers. 112 Thus, the cases do
not distinguish between the offers made and offers accepted in determining
when screening is necessary. Analysis of offers made and offers accepted
indicates that screening should be employed in both situations. The cases
107. Hall v. Small Business Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983); Miller Indus., Inc. v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 516 F. Supp. 84, 89 (S.D. Ala. 1980).
108. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
109. Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co., 783 F.2d 1011, 1015-16 (11th Cir. 1986).
110. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
111. Miller Industries and Hall support screening, holding that unless clerks are screened, the
clerks' conflict of interest will be imputed to their respective judges and the judges must recuse
themselves. Hall, 695 F.2d at 179; Miller Indus., 516 F. Supp. at 89. Hunt seems to indicate that
screening prevents doubts about the clerk's impartiality from attaching to the judge. 783 F.2d at 1016.
Such a proposition is contrary to traditional conflict of interest principles. See infra notes 152-58 and
accompanying text.
112. Hunt, 783 F.2d at 1016; Hall, 695 F.2d at 179; Miller Indus., 516 F. Supp. at 89.
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also do not provide policy bases justifying screening as preventing the
imputation to judges of doubts about their law clerks' appearance of
impartiality. Screening does not remove the logical bases for imputing
conflicts of interest. Instead, screening is used to forgo imputation of
conflicts of interest for policy reasons.11 3 For example, in order to avoid
deterring good lawyers from going into government service, former gov-
ernment lawyers' conflicts of interest are not imputed to their private
employers if the former government lawyers are screened. 114
A lack of policy bases for standards may also result in standards that are
too lax or too strict. Standards which are too lax may allow law clerks'
conflicts of interest to create doubts about their judges' appearance of
impartiality, and damage may be done to public confidence in the neutrality
of the judiciary. If standards are too strict, however, clerks may be disad-
vantaged in seeking employment to follow their clerkships, which are
almost always temporary and of short duration. Judges might have diffi-
culty persuading talented law graduates to become clerks,11 5 and thus may
be deprived of their vital assistance. Therefore, standards should be estab-
lished which go as far as possible towards maintaining the appearance of
judicial impartiality in order to prevent a loss of public credibility; but the
standards must be limited so that they do not deter law graduates from
becoming clerks.
Inconsistency and lack of logical clarity regarding imputing law clerk
conflict of interest in employment negotiations to judges is not confined to
case law. Those professional rules which apply do not address the problem
directly, or provide only general, laudatory guidelines. The C.J.C., the
M.R.P.C., and the American Bar Association's Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility (M.C.P.R.) do not provide for screening of law clerks
in any situations, nor do they address the imputation of law clerk conflicts
of interest to judges." 6 Different courts have different personnel pro-
cedures and rules. 1 7 Some procedures and rules are specific and detailed,
prohibiting or recommending specific activities. 1 8 Others fall short of or
113. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., C.J.C., supra note 29; M.R.P.C., supra note 103; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILrrY (1981) [hereinafter M.C.P.R.].
117. LAw Ct.RK HA BOOK, supra note 42, § 2.250.
118. See, e.g., Wright, Office Manual for Law Clerks (Revised Sept. 1985) (unpublished office
procedures manual of Ninth Circuit judge) (on file with Washington Law Review) [hereinafter Wright,
Office Manual]. This manual states:
A law clerk should be insulated from participation or knowledge of cases in which a prospective
employer is a party or counsel. A prospective employer includes an entity with which active and
serious employment discussions are being conducted, or an entity which has extended an offer of
employment to a clerk, unless the offer has been rejected. Keep the Judge apprised of future
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do not improve upon the C.J.C., M.R.P.C., or M.C.P.R., but are largely
too general or laudatory. 119 Current professional rules do not provide the
guidance or demand the adherence to screening which is needed to protect
public confidence in judicial neutrality. If current professional rules allow
only a few judges to continue to sit on cases in which, due to their clerks'
employment negotiations, they do not appear impartial, belief in the
judicial system as a whole can be diminished. 120
B. Defining When a Reasonable Doubt Exists About the Law Clerk's
Possible Impartiality
Law clerks should be screened from cases in which their proffering
employers have an interest. Such screening would protect judges from the
imputation of doubts about their clerks' appearance of impartiality when
conflict of interest principles are applied to the stages of the employment
negotiation: the interview and the offer (made and accepted) stages.
1. The Interview Stage
Law clerks should not be screened at the interview stage. Interviewing
does not present reasonable doubts about their appearance of impartiality.
Arguably, questions about their appearance of impartiality based on law
clerks' interviewing might be created by the perception that the clerks
would be partial toward the interviewing employers, 121 and attempt to exert
some influence in the court to impress those employers. 122 For instance, if
employer A has interviewed a clerk and also has a case before the clerk's
judge, A's opponent in the case may suspect that the clerk will attempt to
influence the judge in A's favor. The opponent could note that judges'
chambers are small, intimate offices, where working relationships are often
employment plans and prospects so that he may help you identify potential conflicts of interest.
Id. at 6. For a discussion of the "serious employment negotiations" standard, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 136-37.
119. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS, supra note 63, Canon 5(c)(1), which states:
During his clerkship, a law clerk may seek and obtain employment to commence after the
completion of his clerkship; if any [employer] appears in any matter pending before the appointing
judge, the law clerk should promptly bring this fact to the attention of the appointing judge, and the
extent of the law clerk's performance of duties in connection with such matter should be
determined by the appointing judge.
120. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
121. Cf Miller Indus., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 516 F. Supp. 84, 88 (S.D. Ala. 1980).
122. Of course, the vast majority of law clerks would never presume to attempt such improper
action as to try to influence ajudge's decision for personal gain. No such actual impropriety was alleged
in any of the cases cited. The principal issue addressed by this Comment is the appearance of
impropriety or partiality.
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quite close. 123 In such offices clerks can become judges' confidantes. 124
Judges utilize law clerks for such functions as performing research to
support the judge's opinions, writing bench memoranda, and providing
feedback for the judge's ideas. 125 The opponent might suspect an attempt
by the clerk to slant a bench memorandum in A's favor, for example, or give
confidential information to the interviewing employer, using the clerk's
close association with the judge to implement the bias the clerk apparently
had. 126
Law clerks, however, would face practical difficulties and insufficient
incentives for attempting to influence their judges for the benefit of inter-
viewing employers. Clerks may interview with many different employers,
perhaps even more than ten. Attempting to impress them all through an
exertion of influence would be difficult. For instance, in the example above,
the clerk would have to attempt to slant perhaps more than ten bench
memoranda, and influence the judge on each case to favor the interviewing
employer involved. Moreover, for the clerk's influence to impress inter-
viewing employers, the clerk would have to inform the employers of his or
her efforts. The incentive for the clerk to attempt all this, however, is small.
The object of interviews is merely to obtain offers. The object of exerting
influence would be to improve the clerk's chance of receiving offers. But
the amount of influence the clerk could exert in so many cases would likely
be small and would fail to achieve the goal of impressing the interviewing
employer, if the effort were noticed at all. To obtain this tenuous benefit, the
clerk would risk the relationship with the judge, and possibly risk dismissal
from the clerkship. Thus, there is a very limited reasonable basis to
question law clerks' appearance of impartiality based on their interview-
ing.127
123. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
126. The ability to remain neutral in the face of conflicting interests has historically been subject to
doubt. See, e.g., Luke 16:13 (King James Version) ("No servant can serve two masters:. . . Ye cannot
serve God and mammon."); THE FenDEAs= No. 79 (A. Hamilton), reprinted in SEcrED READINGS,
JuDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REmoVAL 1 (G. Winters ed. 1973) ("In the general course of human nature, a
power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will.") (emphasis in original). But see
supra note 122.
127. In Hotel Corp. of South v. Rampart 920, Inc., 46 B.R. 758 (E.D. La. 1985), aff'd, 781 F.2d
901 (5th Cir. 1986), the court implied that mere interviews do not create an appearance of partiality. Id.
at 761. The judge noted that neither of her two clerks had received any offer and,for that reason, she
denied the motion to recuse herself. Id. But see Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1985)
(accidental contact by judge's "headhunters" with firms with cases before judge mandated judge's
recusal). Judges and law clerks are held to the same ethical standards, see supra notes 60-65 and
accompanying text, so the prohibition against judges working on cases in which they have even
discussed employment with firms involved in the case could be applied to clerks as well.
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Even if interviewing actually did create reasonable doubts about law
clerks' impartiality, balancing the need for law clerks in the judicial system
against the minimal conflict of interest presented by interviewing indicates
that interviewing could be allowed. Screening clerks at the interview stage
could effectively deprive a judge of clerks' important assistance in many
cases,1 28 since among all of a judge's clerks, many of the employers who
will come before the judge will most likely be interviewing.
Some judges might ban interviewing altogether to avoid losing their
clerks' assistance. 129 Those clerks would be forced to wait until their
clerkship was over to begin seeking a job. 130 Students would be deterred
from becoming clerks, because it would disadvantage them in seeking the
best jobs. Given the importance of clerks to the judicial system, 131 public
policy should encourage talented law students to become clerks, or at least
not deter them. Balancing the importance of clerks to the judicial system
against the marginal conflict of interest which would be prevented by
screening at the interview stage indicates that screening should be imposed
only after the interview stage.
2. The Offer (Made and Accepted) Stage
a. Offers Made-Proffering Employers
Clerks should be screened as soon as they have received offers; doubts
about the clerks' impartiality increase and the balance of policy considera-
tions shifts when the offer stage is entered. The new professional rules
could require screening of clerks from any contact with cases involving
proffering employers. 132
When employers with cases before the clerk's judge have made the clerk
job offers, the doubts created about the clerk's impartiality are greater than
when the clerk had simply been interviewed. Attempting to influence the
judge to impress employers is less difficult than during the interview stage,
while the incentives are increased. Just as in the interview stage, employer
A's opponent in a case before the clerk's judge would suspect that the clerk
would try to influence the judge in favor of proffering employer A. Every-
thing about the clerk-judge relationship that had led A's opponent to doubt
128. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
129. Perhaps in recognition of this problem, the M.R.P.C. allow interviewing by law clerks, but
only after the the clerk has notified the judge of the negotiations. M.R.P.C., supra note 103, Rule
1. 12(b). Of course, just communicating with the judge could not remove any appearance of partiality,
and thus could not replace the need for screening.
130. See supra note 66.
131. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
132. For definitions of the terms "proffering employer" and "future employer" see supra note 7.
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the clerk's impartiality would be the same as in the interview stage. 133
Unlike the interview stage, though, the pool of proffering employers is
likely to be smaller. 134 The opponent would see far fewer practical limita-
tions to the clerk's attempt to assist proffering employer A than could be
seen with interviewing employers. In the offers made stage the clerk would
only have to track a few bench memoranda and cases to be influenced, for
example. Furthermore, the opponent's fears about the clerk's ability to
manage the situation in favor of A would be more reasonable, since the
opponent is likely to know that an offer was made and that the clerk's
affinity with employerA is stronger than at the interview stage. Contrary to
the interviewing employer, the proffering employer has indicated an accep-
tance of the clerk by extending an offer. The clerk, if truly interested in the
employer, will want to nurture that acceptance. Whether the clerk actually
intends or even desires to help the proffering employer in a case before the
clerk's judge is no longer relevant at this stage. The employer's opponent
will perceive that a different relationship---perhaps a closer relationship-
exists between- the employer and the clerk than between opposing counsel
and the clerk. The uncertainty of neutrality is precisely the doubt that
screening at the offer stage could preempt.
Employer A's opponent could also note that the object of any attempted
influence during the offers made stage would be far more important to the
clerk than merely obtaining offers. Those employers the clerk would be
seeking to impress would be more important to the clerk, since one of them
would certainly become the clerk's employer. In addition, the clerk would
be seeking to improve career factors, such as pay, prestige, and type of
work. Such goals would be much more important to the clerk than obtain-
ing offers.
The balance of policy considerations 135 also shifts when the offers made
stage is entered. The factors which would inhibit law graduates from
becoming clerks are not as influential, since clerks would be allowed at
least to interview. Law clerks who were permitted to interview but screened
from cases involving proffering employers would not face the difficulties in
competing for the best jobs which screening at the interview stage and the
resultant ban on interviewing could create. The law clerks will merely have
to select from among their offers more quickly, and not be involved in cases
133. See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
134. Law clerks could conceivably receive offers from every employer with which they interview.
At that point, the reasons for screening clerks from their proffering employers become operative, and
the clerks should be screened. The policies in favor of foregoing screening of clerks from their
interviewing employers' cases disappear. Clerks at this point must choose more quickly, but are not
entirely precluded from choosing among the best employers.
135. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
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in which their proffering employers were involved. This should not dis-
courage ambitious law students from becoming law clerks, nor deprive
judges of their law clerks' assistance.
Talented law students might also be discouraged from becoming clerks if
courts applied a case-by-case approach; but a bright line rule will better
protect the appearance of judicial impartiality. It is conceivable to establish
a looser rule which, for example, could require screening whenever "se-
rious employment negotiations" 136 are entered into. A bright line rule,
though, emphasizes the appearance of impartiality from the point of view
of the person in the street. A looser standard, which would require the judge
to define "serious" employment negotiations, would place the emphasis on
the judge's perceptions. Most judges would probably feel confident of their
own decisions to maintain their neutrality, but it is the public's perception
of judges' neutrality that must be promoted. The ease with which the
appearance of impartiality can be improperly measured by the lack of
actual partiality can be seen in the Hunt court's reliance on the absence of
any allegations of actual bias on the part of the judge. 137
Rules which are less specific could be difficult to apply-for the judge
and the law clerk-when the clerk is actually in the midst of employment
negotiations. Either party's objectivity might be lessened by their own
involvement in the negotiations and the threatened case; a "flexible" rule
might be less apt to be seen as requiring screening. Only later, if someone
questioned the judge's impartiality for allowing the clerk to remain on the
case, would both the judge and the clerk realize that they had drawn their
own line at the wrong point. Once questions had been raised about the
judge's impartiality, it would be too late to go back and screen the law clerk.
Even if only a few judges made the wrong choice, one judge's appearance
of a lack of impartiality damages public confidence in the judiciary as a
whole. A more specific rule would avoid these problems by defining when
the clerk must be screened.
b. Offers Accepted-Future Employers
A bright line rule which requires screening at the offers made stage
rationally requires screening at the offers accepted stage as well. The
rationale behind the government lawyer rule applies with equal force to
prohibiting law clerk participation in cases involving employers whose
offers have been accepted. Certainly an opposing party would have a
reasonable basis for seeing little difference between the clerk having
received offers and having accepted one offer. The analysis used to infer the
136. See supra note 118.
137. See supra notes 90, 99 and accompanying text.
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possibility of improper advantage to the clerk's proffering employers could
be applied to require screening from cases involving future employers as
well. The incentives for attempting to exert influence are even greater once
an offer has been accepted, because the clerk now would have just one
employer to impress. The clerk could favor employer A with confidence that
A would be in a position to reward the clerk's efforts.
In addition to the existence of more incentives for the clerk at the offers
accepted stage, doubts about the appearance of impartiality are even greater
than at the offers made stage. For instance, an attorney facing a judge
whose clerk is employed by opposing counsel is not likely to distinguish
between a newly hired clerk and a newly hired associate in the opposing
firm. The attorney would no more find it fair for opposing c6unsel's newly
hired associate to be helping the judge than for the newly hired clerk to be
helping the judge. The newly hired associate and the clerk are each
susceptible to the desire to help a fellow employee. Regardless of whether
the desire is acted upon, the appearance of unfairness is sufficient to
warrant screening at this stage.
The principal cases of Miller Industries, Hall, and Hunt imply that only
after law clerks have accepted an offer from an employer does it create
doubts about the appearance of impartiality for the clerks to participate in
any cases involving that employer. 138 In Hall, for example, the court
specifically relies upon the fact that the clerk had accepted an offer of
employment and had continued to work on the case in holding that recusal
was mandated. 139 All three courts reach their conclusions without explica-
tion of their underlying reasoning for their conclusion that screening is
necessary only after offers have been accepted, as opposed to after offers
have been made. 140 This Comment concludes that reasonable doubts about
clerks' impartiality are created when they are involved with their proffering
employers' cases, though, because of the relationship between clerks and
judges and the incentives to attempt to exert influence for proffering
employers. 141
138. See Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co., 783 F2d 1011, 1015-16 (11th Cir. 1986); Hall v.
Small Business Admin., 695 F2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983); Miller Indus., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 516 F. Supp. 84, 88, 89 (S.D. Ala. 1980).
139. Hall, 695 F.2d at 176-77.
140. In addition, without providing the rationale supporting their conclusions regarding ap-
pearances of partiality among law clerks seeking employment, these courts leave room for misin-
terpretation in future cases. Law firms, judges, and law clerks are left with rules whose bases are not
revealed, making conformance with those rules a matter of faith, not understanding agreement.
Admittedly, courts may only speak out on issues which come before them. In light of the fact that
maintaining the appearance of judicial impartiality is a very important issue, perhaps the courts could
have spoken of the rationale used to arrive at their decisions, in order to provide more details or
guidance for judges, law clerks, and lawyers.
141. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
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C. Imputing Doubts About the Law Clerk's Appearance of Impartiality
to the Judge
The new professional rules could require that judges recuse themselves if
their law clerks are not screened from cases involving their proffering
employers. Once the law clerks have received offers, their appearance of
impartiality is reasonably called into doubt. Case law and traditional
conflict of interest principles indicate that doubts about clerks' impartiality
attach to their respective judges. Analogy to rules providing for screening
of former government lawyers helps to justify using screening to prevent
this attachment. If clerks are not screened from those cases involving their
proffering employers, the clerks' respective judges must recuse themselves
to protect the perception of the judiciary's neutrality. 142
1. Case Law
Two principal cases, Hall and Miller Industries, clearly indicate that law
clerks' conflicts of interest damage the clerks' appearance of impartiality,
and that this damage can attach to their respective judges. 143 In Hall, for
instance, the court found the presence or absence of the clerk's actual effect
on the magistrate's decision irrelevant. 144 The court insisted that the clerk's
continuing participation in the case gave rise to an appearance of par-
tiality. 145 Noting clerks' important duties, such as acting as sounding
boards for tentative legal opinions and as researchers assigned to find the
pertinent legal authorities, 146 the court further implied that clerks could be
suspected of misusing their close relationship to judges by performing
those duties in such a way as to influence their judges' decisions in favor of
future employers. 147 Thus, the court linked doubts about the clerk's ap-
pearance of impartiality to the magistrate148 and required the magistrate's
142. If the clerk had been working on a case and then received an offer from an employer with an
interest in that case, at that point the clerk would be required to be screened. Up until that point, the
clerk's position falls under the analysis applied to interviews. See supra notes 121-31 and accompanying
text.
Ifa clerk received offers from employers A, B, and C, and then acceptedA's offer, the clerk obviously
could resume work on cases involving B and C. Any reasonable inference of the clerk's temptation
improperly to assist B or C, which temptation would have been founded upon impressing a future
employer, disappears when those employers' offers are no longer available to the clerk.
143. See supra notes 67-88 and accompanying text.




148. See, e.g., id.; see also supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
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recusal. 149 When the "scales tip [even] slightly in favor of avoiding any
blemish on the impartiality of the federal bench,"'150 recusal is mandated. 151
2. Traditional Conflict of Interest Principles
Traditional conflict of interest principles, such as those used to impute
individual lawyers' conflicts of interest to their firms, indicate that clerks'
conflicts of interest due to employment offers should be imputed to their
judges in every case, regardless of screening. 152 Normally, for instance,
LawyerL, who seeks to represent new client B in the same or a substantially
related matter in which L represented B's adversary, former client A, will
not be allowed to undertake the representation of new client B. Lawyer Us
representation of B would create a serious conflict of interest for Lawyer L.
The lawyer's loyalty to a new or former client may not be as strong as it
should be, due to the conflict between the clients' interests. Lawyer L
probably also has confidential information about past client A which L may
be moved to disclose to client B. These conflicts make it impermissible for
the lawyer to represent B.153
The relationship between lawyers and their firms requires that the dis-
qualification of one be imputed to the entire firm. A firm, just like a single
lawyer, must be loyal to a client. 154 Every lawyer in the firm is also
vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by the other lawyers in
149. Hall, 695 F.2d at 176-77.
150. Dobson v. Camden, 502 F. Supp. 679, 681 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
151. The Miller Industries court found that the law clerk's continuing participation in a case in
which his future employers were counsel mandated the judge's recusal due to a reasonable doubt about
the judge's appearance of impartiality. Miller Indus., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 516 F. Supp. 84,
88-89 (S.D. Ala. 1980). The court in Hall agreed. The opinion in Hall uses almost identical language to
that in MillerIndustries in imputing the clerk's appearance of partiality to the judge. Compare Hall, 695
F.2d at 179, with Miller Indus., 516 F Supp. at 89. The Hunt court did not find that the judge was
required to recuse himself, largely because the clerk had been removed from all work on the case once
the clerk had accepted the offer. Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co., 783 F.2d 1011, 1016 (11th Cir.
1986). The reasoning used to arrive at the decision in Hunt, though, misses the point of recusal:
preventing the appearance of partiality. The Hunt court misread Hall by looking into the judge's
chambers to examine the law clerk's actual work on the case, which had been characterized by the judge
as "ministerial only,..." Id. at 1016; see supra notes 90, 99 and accompanying text. The question
should focus on appearances. The court noted, "Hunt [the party moving for recusal] does not contend
[that there was more substantial, actual involvement by the law clerk], nor does [Hunt] allege any actual
bias on the part of the district judge." Hunt, 783 F2d at 1016. The degree of the clerk's involvement
relates to actual partiality, however, not the appearance of partiality.
152. M.R.P.C., supra note 103, Rule 1.10; accord M.C.P.R., supra note 116, DR 5-105(D).
153. M.R.P.C., supra note 103, Rule 1.9 & comment.
154. M.R.P.C., supra note 103, Rule 1.10 comment.
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the firm. 155 Therefore, none of the lawyers in Lawyer L's firm may represent
client B; the disqualification of Lawyer L is imputed to the entire firm. 156
In the case of a law clerk and a judge, imputing disqualification could
make even more sense than it does in the case of lawyers and their firm. The
relationship of clerk and judge is often far closer than that among lawyers in
a firm. 157 Also, there are far fewer people working in most judges' offices
than in many law firms. 158 Thus, the probability that cases will be discussed
or opinions overheard is far greater in a judge's office than in a law firm, and
the reasons for imputing disqualification are equally as great or greater.
3. Justifying Screening
Policy reasons mitigate against a wholesale recusal of judges whenever
their clerks have conflicts of interest. Screening is acceptable in light of
policy considerations which allow screening of former government lawyers
to prevent the imputation of conflict of interest to their private employers. In
the interest of not deterring good lawyers from entering government ser-
vice, the M.R.P.C. allow screening to prevent the imputation of conflict of
interest from former government lawyers to their firms. 159 Just as society
needs talented lawyers to work for the government, society also needs
talented law graduates to become law clerks. Many courts would find it
incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to operate without law clerks to
provide the research, writing, and other functions judges have come to rely
upon. 16 Requiring recusal of judges whenever there were doubts about
their clerks' impartiality would mean that once a law clerk has been made
offers by an employer, the judge would not hear any cases in which that
employer had an interest. This could cause judges to prohibit any employ-
ment negotiations by their clerks. Such a prohibition would deter law
graduates from becoming clerks in the same way that requiring imputation
of former government lawyers' conflicts of interest to their private employ-
ers would deter lawyers from entering government service. For the same
policy reasons that persuade society to accommodate former government
lawyers and not to require that their conflicts of interest be imputed to their
firms, the law clerks' conflict of interest problem can be accommodated.
155. Id.
156. M.R.P.C., supra note 103, Rule 1.10.
157. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
158. Mostjudges employ only a few clerks, see, e.g., Baier, supra note 2, at 1133-35, while many
law firms are much larger. Cf., Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 569 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (stressing the "nature of the judge-law clerk relationship" as a basis
for imputation of an appearance of partiality from law clerk to judge).
159. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
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With screening, doubts about the law clerks' appearance of impartiality
need not be imputed to their respective judges, and the judges need not
recuse themselves. 161
D. Proposed Rule for Judges and Law Clerks
A rule of professional conduct for both judges and law clerks regarding
law clerk employment negotiations could be adopted to protect judges'
appearance of impartiality. Screening of law clerks could be required to
isolate them from any contact with cases in which their proffering employ-
ers have an interest. 162 Thus, if a judge's law clerk received offers of
employment from Firms A, B, and C, the rule would require that the clerk
be screened from all cases in which Firms A, B, and C act as counsel or are
parties. This rule could also require that, if clerks who have received offers
are not screened from cases involving their proffering employers, their
respective judges must recuse themselves. If the judge did not screen the
clerk after Firm A made its offer to the clerk, the judge must be recused to
prevent the clerk's apparent conflict of interest, which has attached to the
judge, from tainting the rest of the bench.
A commentary to the rule should also be adopted, explaining the policy
bases and rationale behind screening of the clerk at the offer received
stage. 163 This would provide both judges and clerks with a better under-
standing of why the rule was instituted, and why it is logical to require
screening at the point described. The policies served include promoting
public confidence in the neutrality of the judiciary while encouraging
talented law graduates to become law clerks.
E. Using Training, Written Guidelines, and Communication To Prevent
Imputation of Law Clerks' Conflict of Interest to Their Judges
As a further measure to protect the appearance of judicial impartiality,
judges could seek to provide extensive training to reduce conflicts of
interest among law clerks seeking employment. Although it would be
161. However, if effective screening cannot be established, that is, if the judge has only one law
clerk, then the judge must be required to recuse herself, or the doubt about the law clerk's appearance of
impartiality will attach to the judge. The decision in Dobson v. Camden implicitly accepts this
rationale. 502 F. Supp. 679, 681 n."*" (S.D. Tex. 1980).
162. See Aronson, An Overview of the Law of Professional Responsibility: The Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct Annotated and Analyzed, 61 WAsH. L. REv. 825, 830 (1986) (suggesting that judges
should also be required to obtain the parties' consent).
163. The M.R.P.C. provide good examples of such commentary. See, e.g., M.R.P.C., supra note
103, Rule 1.11 comment (explaining policy allowing screening of former government lawyers to prevent
imputation of those lawyers' conflicts of interest to their private firms).
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idealistic to suggest that conflicts could be completely prevented, some
measures could reduce the occurrence of law clerk conflicts of interest
created by employment negotiations. One method is to train law clerks to
recognize and avoid conflicts of interest which may arise during their
clerkships. 164 Specific training, pointing out the ethical pitfalls which may
be encountered in the clerkship, 165 given by the clerks' respective judges
would remove misconceptions clerks may have about their professional and
ethical duties.166 Training that is focused on the particular conflict of
interest problems facing law clerks seeking employment could accomplish
much toward preventing conflicts problems for law clerks and their judges.
Unfortunately, although some judges do provide training, 167 others simply
expect their clerks to learn the ropes as they go along. 168
Training could consist of a half-day meeting early on in the clerkship, in
which the judge would discuss with the clerk important topics regarding
judicial ethics and appearances. The judge would discuss the necessity that
the judiciary maintain its appearance of neutrality in order to uphold the
public's confidence in the judiciary and its willingness to abide by judicial
decisions. The judge would also take great care to alert the clerk to
considerations associated with employment negotiations, such as protect-
ing confidentiality and not allowing the creation of any appearance of bias.
Written materials would provide the best source of information for new
law clerks. The clerks could refer to the manuals whenever they had a
question. In addition, there would be much less doubt about what the
judge's requirements were than might exist as memories of an initial oral
orientation faded during the clerk's tenure. 169 The written guidelines
164. In order to graduate from law school, students must have taken and passed a course in
professional responsibility. Aronson & Martin, supra note 60, at 13. Law clerks, who have graduated
from law school, should (in theory) know from their professional responsibility courses about conflict
of interest issues before beginning their clerkships. Some may note that therefore it is not the courts'
place to provide such training. The facts of cases such as Hall and Hunt suggest that although all clerks
should perhaps know better, some apparently do not.
Externs-students still in law school working for ajudge during part of a school year-may not have
had a professional responsibility course before their externships, and may not know about appearance of
impartiality problems, conflict of interest, etc. Training is therefore especially important for extems,
and the judge has even greater responsibility and motivation to provide instruction in ethics.
165. This Comment attempts to provide some insight into the pitfalls associated with law clerks'
employment negotiations. There are, or course, many other potential problems of which clerks and
judges must be aware. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 43.
166. Aronson & Martin, supra note 60, at 18. Clerks may not understand or be familiar with the
potential ethical problems, requirements, and consequences which may arise during their tenure.
Training could point out these issues and allow clerks and their judges simply to avoid many such
problems.
167. See, e.g., Wright, Office Manual, supra note 118.
168. Baier, supra note 2, at 1128.
169. A statistical study on training for confidentiality issues could well apply to training methods
for other ethics subjects, such as conflict of interest. Comment, supra note 43, at 1265 (ninety-four
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should be specific and thorough. They could require that clerks keep their
judges informed before and during any negotiations, and they could let the
clerks know that the clerks will be screened from any cases involving
proffering employers. The reasons underlying these standards should be
clearly set forth.
One Ninth Circuit judge's Office Manual for Law Clerks provides a good
example of such a manual. It is detailed and covers many areas of potential
problems clerks might encounter during their tenure. 170 The judge's man-
ual also requires that law clerks communicate with the judge about future
employment plans so that the judge may help the clerk recognize potential
conflicts of interest. 171 This kind of communication is also critical to
preventing law clerk conflicts of interest which could taint the judge. 172
Law clerks could be admonished to inform judges as soon as they have
begun interviewing, so that judges will be ready to screen the clerks once
employment offers are made. Clerks should be encouraged to ask judges
any questions about matters which might reflect upon the judges' profes-
sional reputations.
The new professional rules could establish an affirmative duty for law
firms, requiring them to inform a judge when one of the judge's clerks is
being interviewed by that firm. This affirmative duty would act as double
protection, since law clerks may have an interest in not informing judges to
avoid being removed from the case. This redundant system would insure
that judges would know of the potential problem, and be ready to take
appropriate action should a law clerk's appearance of impartiality come
into question.
III. CONCLUSION
Law clerks will negotiate for employment during their clerkships. This
practice should be allowed and endorsed. Rules which prohibit or restrict
such negotiations could deter talented students from becoming law clerks
and inhibit the clerks' important contributions to the judicial system.
Employment negotiations, however, create potential conflicts of interest
which can be imputed to the judges employing the clerks.
Professional rules of conduct, consistent throughout all jurisdictions,
could be established to provide specifically for screening law clerks from
cases in which their proffering employers have an interest. Careful analysis
percent of judges responding to survey used oral instructions to law clerks regarding confidentiality;
only fifty percent used guidelines in a written manual).
170. Wright, Office Manual, supra note 118, at 6.
171. Id.; Aronson & Martin, supra note 60, at 9.
172. Aronson & Martin, supra note 60, at 9.
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of conflict of interest rules in other areas indicates specific standards for law
clerks seeking employment. Although reasonable doubts about the clerks'
appearances of impartiality attach to their respective judges if the clerks are
involved with cases in which their proffering employers have an interest,
for policy reasons judges may avoid recusal by screening their clerks from
such cases. If judges fail to screen their clerks in such cases, the rules
should mandate recusal.
Law clerk conflicts of interest could be avoided in many cases if the
clerks were provided with adequate training about the dangers inherent in
negotiating for employment during their clerkships. Written guidelines
reinforcing this training are essential. As an integral part of their training,
clerks could be encouraged to communicate openly with their respective
judges about all employment negotiations they undertake during their
clerkships. Judges themselves are in the best position to forestall future
difficulties with a few simple instructions and quick action where neces-
sary.
Kevin D. Swan
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